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Abstract 
This paper studies the role of public policy to promote efficiency in human capital 
accumulation in the representative agent framework. Agents accumulate human capital by 
spending time in home study and in publicly provided schools. The individual faces an 
aggregate externality in the accumulation of skills. In addition, the return to time spent in 
school is subject to congestion. To correct these distortions, a tuition fee combined with 
personal stipends is required, which shifts education in schools and universities to 
noninstitutional forms of learning such as home study. The dynamic effects of shifts in 
education policy as well as their welfare implications are also calculated in the paper. 
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1. Introduction
Manpower quality has long been recognized as one of the most important sources of
economic growth.1 Education and training are also believed to yield important social
returns.2 Promoting human capital formation has, thus, long been a prime public policy
concern. In fact, most governments have devised a large array of programs to improve
educational attainment. Most, if not all, countries have a system of public schools, with
primary and secondary education virtually free. Not only are numerous grants, subsidies
and loans available to encourage higher education, but students are also oﬀered a wide
variety of institutions. Access to public universities is free in continental Europe and
in many other countries as well. What is the basis for the significant level of public
funds that is channeled into the educational system? Should governments, apart from
distributing personal subsidies, also provide free access to higher educational institutions,
as in continental Europe? Or should they charge tuition fees, as is commonly the case
in the United States? This paper discusses optimal policies to provide agents with the
correct incentives for education in the presence of spillovers in learning and potential
crowding of public educational infrastructure.
To address these questions, we present a simple model of education production that
relies on private time inputs and public infrastructure, such as schools and universities, in-
cluding their equipment. A novel feature of our approach is an additional decision margin
that has been neglected by the existing literature. Apart from the overall time allocated
to education, agents may also decide how to allocate this time budget to home study and
school attendance. Home study activity, which includes learning within families and firms,
may be viewed as a noninstitutional source of skill formation. Heckman (1999), for one,
considers this type of learning to be as important a source of skill acquisition as formal
1See the evidence of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1993), Jorgenson, Ho and Fraumeni (1994), and
Griliches (1997).
2A strain in the endogenous growth literature assumes that educational spillovers are so strong that
they result in constant returns to aggregate human capital accumulation. See Lucas (1988) and Chamley
(1993).
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schooling. This extension allows us to analyze how governments may prevent possible
congestion of their educational infrastructure by creating incentives for noninstitutional
learning outside of school facilities.
We believe that our model connects quite well to the current debate on higher educa-
tion policies, especially in continental Europe. These countries have traditionally oﬀered
free access to universities and other institutions of higher education. The supply of public
educational infrastructure has not, however, kept pace with the rise in the number of stu-
dents in the last decades. Accordingly, universities are severely under-equipped to serve
this increase.3 This has lead to over-crowded classrooms, a rising number of students per
professor, increasingly restricted access to libraries and computer equipment, and, finally,
to an increase in the average length of time required to complete a degree.4 Such indica-
tors of congestion have prompted a number of governments to consider tuition fees with
the explicit intention of shortening the average study length and discouraging attendance
of marginal students. For example, the Austrian government will formally introduce tu-
ition fees starting in 2001, which will be partly compensated by student stipends. A
number of German federal states have proposed charging fees to students who exceed the
average study length. We interpret such measures as an attempt to reduce congestion of
educational infrastructure. If tuition fees are combined with personal stipends, students
are encouraged to shift to other noninstitutional forms of learning such as home study,
rather than to completely sacrifice the opportunity for advanced training. Our model
implies that governments, for reasons of eﬃciency, should encourage education in general,
but also charge tuition to avoid congestion of school infrastructure. We, thus, provide a
3Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) view congestion as a pervasive problem for publicly provided goods.
Lazear (1999) argues that congestion is particularly important in classroom education and is, in addition,
crucial in determining optimal student/teacher ratio.
4For the data on the increase in the duration of study in the Austrian case, see the Report on Higher
Education by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science (1999). This increase has taken place across
almost all fields of study and been particularly severe in business administration, medicine, law, electrical
engineering, and pharmacy. Using data from previous years of the Report, we also find evidence of rising
student/faculty ratios.
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rationale for granting educational subsidies independent of distributional considerations,
which tend to dominate public discussions of this issue.
These arguments are formalized in a model that captures the key influences on human
capital formation. These include individual and community eﬀort, educational subsidies
or taxes imposed on the time spent in private educational activity or in public schools,
and the level of public educational infrastructure. Section 2 describes the model and
develops the decentralized equilibrium. Section 3 then compares the market allocation
with the social optimum. Here we show that the optimal policy can be to subsidize overall
educational eﬀort and, simultaneously, to tax time spent using the publicly provided
educational infrastructure. Section 4 derives the log-linearized form of the model, with
details to be found in an Appendix, and discusses the comparative dynamic eﬀects of
public infrastructure and subsidy/tuition policies. Section 5 briefly concludes.
2. Decentralized Equilibrium
2.1. The Model
In this section we will describe a representative agent model in which skills, or human cap-
ital, are accumulated through eﬀort and educational infrastructure. Unlike Lucas (1988)
and Chamely (1993), human capital formation is bounded, reflecting diminishing returns
to education. Unbounded accumulation is prevented by the fact that old agents loose part
of their skills in the process of aging and, eventually, all skills with death. In a state of de-
mographic and economic equilibrium, education of young agents and death of old agents
just balances to give a finite constant stock of aggregate skills. One way to incorporate
bounded human capital accumulation in an aggregate model – short of explicitly model-
ing and aggregating the life-cycle education decisions of overlapping generations – is to
assume depreciation of human capital and diminishing returns to education in an infinitely
3
lived representative agent model.5 We believe that the representative agent framework
is useful for the purposes of this paper, since the emphasis is on eﬃciency aspects of
government education policy rather than on questions of intergenerational distribution.
The process of individual skill accumulation in our model depends on own and aggre-
gate eﬀort, as well as on the services of schools. To acquire skills, individuals typically
spend some time attending schools. Expenditures on education include salaries for teach-
ers as well as outlays for maintaining and possibly expanding the number of schools and
their facilities. These services encourage individual learning, i.e., the accumulation of
human capital. We consider schools in this framework to be “impure” public goods.6
Schools are also to a certain extent non-rival, since it is not automatically the case that
an additional student “in class” reduces one-for-one the educational services received by
another student. The government in our model provides an aggregate level of educational
infrastructure, K. We will assume a complementarity between eﬀort and the level of
schools, so that individuals become more eﬀective in improving their skills if the level of
public expenditures on schools is high. To keep the dynamics simple, we will model K as
a flow variable.7 Like other forms of government expenditure, an increase in expenditures
on schools will divert resources from private consumption. As indicated, we will study the
case in which these educational services are subject to spillovers. We shall then specify
individual human capital accumulation in the following way
h˙ = G(e,Ks)Hγ − δh, Ks = i (i/I)σK, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, 0 < γ < 1, (2.1)
where h is the individual, H the aggregate stock of human capital, and G(e,Ks) the com-
ponent of human capital accumulation that depends on individual eﬀort and the supply
5Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) employ an OG model to analyze the eﬀect on growth and income
inequality of private versus public education regimes.
6We follow the definition of Oakland (1972), who cites congestion externalities as leading to “impurity”
in public goods. Of course, the existence of tuition or fees implies that schools are also excludable goods
whether or not they are publicly or privately provided.
7A more complete, although more complicated, model would specify thatK is a stock that depreciates
at a certain rate. Such an approach has been recently adopted by Fisher and Turnovsky (1998).
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of public school infrastructure.8 The agent allocates his time endowment, (normalized
to one), to total educational eﬀort or work, l. We further assume that the time devoted
to education can be broken-down into a home study component, e, and a component
representing the time spent in schools, i, so that l = 1 − e − i. We term the time spent
in acquiring skills away from school as “home study”, but this should be thought of as
any type of educational activity independent of public educational facilities. Home study
does not generate external eﬀects in our framework.
In addition to devoting time to home study, the student gains skills by using the
services, Ks, of schools. We assume in (2.1) that the services of schools depend on the
individual, i, and the aggregate amount of time, I, spent in schools as well as on the
supply of schools, K. In our formulation of Ks, the influence of the aggregate time spent
in school depends on the function (i/I)σ. The degree of congestion in school depends on
the parameter σ. If σ = 0, then schools are strictly non-rival public goods that can be
consumed simultaneously by all students. In this case each student appropriates iK in
public school services if he spends i units of time attending classes. If, on the other hand,
0 < σ ≤ 1, then the services of public schools are subject to congestion externalities.
Here, the same amount of time spent in school yields only i[(i/I)σK] in services if classes
are “crowded”, because congestion deteriorates the quality of services, with a larger value
of σ corresponding to a higher degree of congestion.9
Along with the spillovers arising from school attendance, we specify in (2.1) that
individual human capital accumulation depends positively on the level of aggregate skills,
H, where γ parametrizes the extent of this spillover. In other words, we consider, as do
8Lower case variables will refer to individual quantities, while upper case variables will denote aggregate
levels. Unless indicated, we will suppress a variable’s functional dependence on time. A dot over a variable
indicates a time derivative.
9If σ = 1, then schools have an eﬀective capacity equal to (i/I)K. This case represents proportional
congestion, since school capacity remains constant only if the aggregate level of schools, K, increases in
direct proportion to aggregate attendance, I. Our interpretation is similar to that used by Fisher and
Turnovsky (1998). Observe, finally, that we exclude the case of positive aggregate attendance spillovers.
This would correspond to −1 < σ < 0.
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Cooper and John (1988), that it is easier to acquire skills if others also have them.10 For
simplicity, and with no loss in generality, we impose linear homogeneity on G. Since, as
indicated, this is a model of bounded human capital accumulation, we specify in (2.1)
that skills deteriorate at the constant rate δ.
A simple specification of production is to consider a dynamic Ricardian model in
which human capital is the sole input. Given a human capital stock h inherited from the
individual’s previous educational decisions, eﬀective labor supply is lh = (1 − e − i)h,
which produces the following output level:
y = (1− e− i)h. (2.2)
Eﬀective labor earns its marginal product w = 1, i.e. the real wage is fixed at unity. Our
framework then implies that if the individual decides to spend more time in acquiring
skills, either in home study or in school, he sacrifices current wage income in exchange for
a higher level of human capital in the future.
We assume that a continuum of identical agents with unit mass maximizes the dis-
counted time-separable utility of consumption over an infinite horizon. Intertemporal
preferences for each agent are given by
U0 =
Z ∞
0
e−ρtu(c)dt, (2.3)
where ρ is the exogenous rate of time preference. A further simplifying specification
restricts instantaneous preferences to the logarithmic case, u(c) = ln c. In addition to the
time constraint l = 1 − e − i, the individual’s actions are subject to the accumulation
equations for assets and human capital
(a) a˙ = ra+ w[1− (1− τ )e− (1− τ + z)i]h− χ− c,
(b) h˙ = G(e,Ks)Hγ − δh,
(2.4)
10This formulation is akin to the models of Romer (1986, 1989) in which the aggregate capital stock
embodies the stock of knowledge. Some suggestive empirical evidence for this has been provided by
Glaeser (1994), who shows that the level of schooling has a powerful eﬀect on the growth of schooling.
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where a represents financial assets that yield a real return r, c is consumption, and χ
are lump-sum taxes, (the government budget constraint will be introduced below). In
equation (2.4a), educational subsidy policy is introduced. We specify that the total time
devoted to education, e+ i, receives a subsidy, or stipend, τ . This is a reasonable assump-
tion, we believe, because educational stipends do not in general discriminate between the
time spent in home study and that spent attending school. We assume, in addition, that
the time spent using the educational infrastructure attracts a specific fee, denoted by z.
For reference, equation (2.4b) repeats (2.1).11
2.2. Optimality Conditions and Market Equilibrium
In solving the utility-maximizing problem, we attach the multipliers λ and µ, respectively,
to the dynamic constraints a˙ and h˙. The optimizing choices satisfy the following first-order
conditions:
(a) c : 1/c = λ,
(b) e : (1− τ)wh = (µ/λ)Ge(e,Ks)Hγ,
(c) i : (1− τ + z)wh = (µ/λ)Gk(e,Ks)Hγ (1+ σ) (i/I)σK,
(d) a : λ˙/λ = ρ− r,
(e) h : µ˙/µ = ρ+ δ − (λ/µ)w[1− (1− τ )e− (1− τ + z)i].
(2.5)
According to (2.5a), the agent chooses a level of consumption so that its marginal utility
equals its shadow value, λ. In deciding how much time to spend on private study or in
school, agents compare the marginal foregone wage income today, net of subsidies and fees,
with the present value (µ/λ) of future wage incomes that accrues because education raises
the future stock of human capital. The existence of aggregate human capital spillovers
and the externalities arising from the decision to accumulate human capital in school
11We could also incorporate an explicit labor/leisure choice into the problem and specify that educa-
tional subsidies and infrastructure expenditure are financed using taxes on labor income. By making
the admittedly strong assumption of lump-sum taxation, we focus on the allocating role of educational
policies and keep the algebraic solution of the model as simple as possible.
7
modify the optimality conditions for e and i. The return on home study, GeH
γ, depends
on the aggregate stock of human capital as well as on individual eﬀort.
The return on time spent in school depends on the term Hγ (1+ σ) (i/I)σK , which,
in addition to Hγ , is a function of the ratio (i/I), the supply of public schools K, and
the congestion parameter σ. Under conditions of congestion, (σ > 0), an individual
student may not only exploit a given eﬀective capacity per student, (i/I)σK, for a longer
time-span i, but may also attain for his own use a larger share of the overall eﬀective
capacity (i/I)σK. In other words, congestion leads individuals to believe that they may
capture a larger fraction of the overall capacity by attending classes more intensively. The
existence of aggregate human capital spillovers and the externalities arising from public
school attendance must be taken into account in evaluating the overall benefits of time
spent at home and in school and will, as we will show below, determine socially optimal
values for τ and z. The last two optimality conditions describe, respectively, the evolution
of the shadow values of wealth and human capital if optimal paths of these two variables
are chosen. In addition, the accumulation of financial assets and human capital must
satisfy the usual transversality conditions.
To calculate the decentralized macroeconomic equilibrium, we use the assumption of
a continuum of identical agents to derive that the aggregate times devoted to work, home
study, and time in school are given, respectively, by L = l, E = e, and I = i. Applying
these relations to (2.1), we rewrite the aggregate human capital accumulation function as
G = G (e, iK) = eg(Ki/e), (2.6)
where Ks = iK. Linear homogeneity allows us to write G in the intensive form, eg(Ki/e),
where g is increasing and concave. Since there is no net trading of financial assets in
equilibrium and, by assumption, no government debt, we can set a˙ = a = 0 and A˙ =
A = 0. Using this fact and the aggregate relationships, the economy-wide private sector
budget constraint is given by
C + T + ziH = [L+ τ (e+ i)]H, (2.7)
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where C, T , L andH correspond to aggregate consumption, lump-sum taxes, labor supply
and human capital, respectively. The government pays for its expenditures on schools and
finances its subsidy policies by levying lump-sum taxes and tuition fees. This implies that
the aggregate government budget constraint equals
K + τ (e+ i)H = T + ziH. (2.8)
Substituting the government into the private sector budget constraint and using the ag-
gregate version of (2.2), we obtain the following market-clearing condition
C +K = LH ≡ Y, (2.9)
where Y = (1− e− i)H is aggregate output.12
To derive the economy’s dynamics, we will first obtain an equilibrium restriction on
the ratio of time spent in school to time spent in home study. Without loss of generality,
we can simplify our analysis by assuming that the human capital accumulation function
G has a Cobb-Douglas specification, so that α = eGe/G and 1− α = iKGK/G.13 Using
the equilibrium versions of (2.5b-c), the ratio i/e is given by:
i
e
=
(1+ σ) (1− α)
α
· 1− τ
1− τ + z . (2.10)
Observe that the ratio i/e depends, in addition to the technology and congestion param-
eters, exclusively on τ and z. Rewriting (2.5b) and using our technological assumptions
and the intensive form of G, we obtain
λ
µ
=
αg(Ki/e)Hγ−1
1− τ , (2.11)
which we substitute into (2.5e) to obtain the dynamic equation for the shadow price. This,
together with (2.4b), forms the dynamic system in (µ,H) that determines the evolution
of intertemporal macroeconomic equilibrium
(a) µ˙ = (ρ+ δ − rH)µ, rH ≡ αg(Ki/e)Hγ−1
1−τ [1− (1− τ)e− (1− τ + z)i] ,
(b) H˙ = eg (Ki/e)Hγ − δH,
(2.12)
12Hereafter, we shall designate the equilibrium time spent in home study and in school, e and i, with
lower case letters, while all other variables will be denoted with upper case.
13The Cobb-Douglas form implies G = eg(Ki/e) and g = (Ki/e)1−α.
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where rH denotes the rate of return on human capital (so that the implicit return on
financial assets is r = rH − δ). Consider the dynamics of the shadow value, µ. If the
return to human capital rH is high, the shadow value µ of new skills is also high. Agents
increase their eﬀorts at education. The shadow value declines as the skill levels improve
and the return on human capital is driven down to the long-run rate equal to ρ+ δ.
To complete the description of intertemporal equilibrium, we next show how e and i
depend on the dynamic variables and exogenous policy parameters. The time e devoted
to home study and the time i spent in school are interdependent according to (2.10). Note
further that the ratio i/e does not depend on µ and H, but only on the subsidy and fee
rates τ and z, the share parameter α, and the congestion parameter σ. Nevertheless, both
e and i can be expressed as a function of the dynamic variables µ and H. Substituting
aggregate consumption, C = 1/λ, into (2.5b), using the Cobb-Douglas specification of g,
and replacing C from the product market clearing condition (2.9) yields:
(1− τ) = µαg(Ki/e)Hγ [1− [1+ (i/e)]e−K/H] . (2.13)
This equation solves for e(µ,H; τ, z,K) and, since (2.10) fixes the ratio i/e, also the value
of g(Ki/e).14 In the Appendix, we derive a log-linearized version of the dynamic equations
(2.12). Using this system, discussed below in Section 4, we can obtain analytical solutions
for µ and H and can calculate the long-run comparative dynamics for these variables with
respect to government infrastructure expenditure and stipend/tuition policy.
The steady state equilibrium occurs when H˙ = µ˙ = 0. It consists of the following
relationships
(a) H1−γ∞ =
e∞g(·)
δ
, (b) H1−γ∞ =
αg(·)
ρ+ δ
"
1
1− τ −
Ã
1+
(1+ σ) (1− α)
α
!
e∞
#
, (2.14)
where (2.10) has been used to obtain (2.14b) and the subscript ∞ denotes a steady state
value. We can now state the first proposition of the paper.
Proposition 1. (Steady State Time Allocations in Decentralized Equilibrium)
The steady state allocations of time spent in home study and time spent in school are
14Once e(µ,H; τ, z,K) is obtained, i(µ,H; τ, z,K) is calculated using (2.10).
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given by:
(a) e∞ = 11−τ · αδρ+δ+δ[α+(1+σ)(1−α)] ,
(b) i∞ = 11−τ+z · δ(1+σ)(1−α)[ρ+δ+δ{α+(1+σ)(1−α)}] .
(2.15)
The long-run expression for e∞ was found by equating the two conditions (2.14), while
the long-run solution for i∞ was determined by substituting (2.15a) into the ratio (2.10).
Observe that e∞ and i∞ depend on the parameters of the model, such as σ, and on the
overall subsidy rate τ , but not on the aggregate human capital spillover parameter γ or on
the level of educational infrastructure K.15 The latter is a consequence of employing the
Cobb-Douglas specification in the human capital accumulation function.16 Nevertheless,
even if the time spent in skill accumulation does not depend on the level of infrastructure,
the stock of human capital, H∞, always does. With the i/e-ratio, and, consequently
g(Ki/e), determined by (2.10), the long-run skill level H∞ is then inferred from (2.14a)
and its shadow value µ∞ from (2.13). In examining the solutions for e∞ and i∞, we
can also investigate the influence of the congestion parameter σ. It is straightforward to
show that e∞ is smaller and i∞ is larger if there are congestion externalities in school,
0 < σ ≤ 1. The individual then strives to acquire human capital by attending school
more intensively while reducing the time spent in home study.
To consider the steady state influence of subsidy, tuition, and infrastructure policy on
the time spent at home and at school as well as on the stock of human capital and its
shadow value, we next state the following proposition.17
Proposition 2. (Impact of Education Subsidy and Infrastructure Policy) The
impact of education subsidies on the long-run time allocations to home and school eﬀort
is equal to:
(a) eˆ∞ =
1− τ + z
1− τ τˆ , (b) ıˆ∞ = τˆ − zˆ. (2.16)
15While the aggregate human capital spillover aﬀects neither the level nor the division of time spent
in home study or in school, it does aﬀect their productivity.
16In the case of non-unitary elasticity of substitution, the results would be more complicated. In
general, the steady state levels of e and i would then depend on K.
17A logarithmic derivative of a variable x is denoted xˆ = dx/x. The exceptions are τˆ ≡ dτ/(1− τ + z)
and zˆ ≡ dz/(1− τ + z), respectively. We also make the innocuous assumption that (1− τ + z) > 0.
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The eﬀect of subsidy and infrastructure policy on steady state human capital is:
Hˆ∞ =
1
1− γ
·
(1− α)(Kˆ − zˆ) +
µ
1+
αz
1− τ
¶
τˆ
¸
. (2.17)
The eﬀect on the long-run shadow value of human capital equals
µˆ∞ = −1−α−(1−γ)k(1−γ)(1−k) Kˆ + 1−α−(1−γ)sI(1−γ)(1−k) zˆ − 1−(1−γ)s¯−[(1−γ)(s¯−sI )−α]z/(1−τ)(1−γ)(1−k) τˆ , (2.18)
where sI ≡ i/l, s¯ ≡ (1− l)/l, and k ≡ K/Y .
Logarithmic derivatives of (2.15) were taken to obtain (2.16). Observe that the long-
run response of home study, eˆ∞, depends solely, though more than proportionately, on
the rate of change of the overall subsidy rate τˆ . In contrast, the adjustment of school
attendance, ıˆ∞, depends on the diﬀerence between the rates of change of the overall
subsidy and the tuition fee, τˆ − zˆ. Both eˆ∞ and ıˆ∞ are, however, independent of Kˆ.18
To calculate the long-run impact of subsidy policy on Hˆ∞, we substituted eˆ∞ and ıˆ∞
into the percentage change of g, gˆ = (1 − α)[Kˆ + ıˆ∞ − eˆ∞] = (1 − α)
h
K − zˆ − z
1−τ τˆ
i
,
and the resulting expression into the log-linearized version of (2.14a), which is equal to
Hˆ∞ = (1− γ)−1 (eˆ∞ + gˆ). This yields (2.17). According to (2.17), improved educational
infrastructure and more generous subsidies serve to expand human capital. Higher tuition
fees would tend to lower Hˆ∞. The extent of the changes depends on the factor shares,
the spillover parameter γ, and the initial subsidy and tuition rates τ and z.
Next, substituting eˆ∞, gˆ, and Hˆ∞ into equation (A.6) (derived in the appendix),
we solve in (2.18) for the long-run comparative statics for the shadow value of human
capital. Whether µˆ∞ rises or falls depends in general on the resource cost of the policy
change relative to its eﬀect on the returns to educational activities. Consider the following
illustrative cases. In the absence of human capital spillovers, γ = 0, an increase in Kˆ will
lower (raise) µˆ∞ if the output share of schooling infrastructure k is less (greater) than the
infrastructure share in skill production, 1 − α. With positive spillovers, the same eﬀect
18The congestion parameter σ drops out of the steady state expressions for eˆ∞ and ıˆ∞. This is a
consequence of having imposed a unitary elasticity of substitution in skill production.
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continues to hold for even higher values of k. Similarly, if we set the initial subsidy and
tax rates at zero, τ = z = 0, assume there is no congestion, σ = 0, and substitute for s¯
and sI , we can then show that increases in τˆ and decreases in zˆ reduce µˆ∞.19
3. Social Optimum
3.1. Optimality Conditions and Equilibrium
Private agents take as given the number of schools and the educational eﬀorts of other
agents. Society at large, however, faces a trade-oﬀ between the resource cost of public
infrastructure and the returns that result from changing τ and z, which include any ex-
ternalities involved in the process of acquiring skills. Weighing the per-capita benefits
against the resource costs of marginally expanding the size of educational infrastructure
determines a welfare maximizing number of schools. This trade-oﬀ and its welfare im-
plications are addressed by a social planning approach in which per-capita intertemporal
utility is maximized subject to the aggregate resource constraints, i.e., the market-clearing
condition for the output and the law of motion for human capital. In deciding on behalf
of the entire community, the planner chooses the eﬀort of all agents simultaneously. This
takes into account the aggregate level of externalities in school attendance. The planner
internalizes these spillovers by setting i = I, which results in Ks = iK. By equating
h = H, the planner also takes into account how the aggregate level of human capital
contributes to skill accumulation. This planning problem can, therefore, be stated as:
max
Z ∞
0
e−ρt ln(C)dt s.t. C +K = (1− i− e)H, H˙ = G(e, iK)Hγ − δH. (3.1)
19Evaluating (2.15) in this case, we have e = αδ/(ρ + 2δ) and i = e (1− α) /α. Equation (A.1) then
gives s¯ = δ/(ρ+ δ) and sI = (1− α) s¯.
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The social optimum is characterized by the following maximum conditions:
(a) e : H
1−γ
C
= µGe(e, iK),
(b) i : H
1−γ
C
= µGK(e, iK)K,
(c) K : H
−γ
C
= µGK(e, iK)i,
(d) H : µ˙/µ = ρ+ δ − γG(e, iK)Hγ−1 − θ
µC
(1− e− i).
(3.2)
Condition (3.2a) weighs the utility cost of forgone consumption against the utility gain
from increased skills due to a socially optimal time spent in home study. Conditions
(3.2b,c) apply the same criterion to determine the optimal intensity of school attendance
and educational infrastructure. Condition (3.2d) describes the socially optimal evolution
of the shadow value of skills. Using the intensive form of G described in footnote 13 and
assuming Cobb-Douglas technology, we obtain from (3.2a),
1
µC
= αg(Ki/e)Hγ−1, (3.3)
which is the socially optimal version of (2.11). Substituting (3.3) into (3.2d) yields
µ˙/µ = ρ+ δ − rH∗ , rH∗ = [γe+ α(1− i− e)] g(Ki/e)Hγ−1, (3.4)
where rH
∗
is the social return of human capital (henceforth, we will denote a socially
optimal value by the superscript ∗). Next, combining (3.2a,b) yields the socially optimal
ratio of time spent in school to time in home study:
µ
i
e
¶∗
=
1− α
α
. (3.5)
Equation (3.5) implies that (i/e)∗ should be set equal to the ratio of the factor shares of
school services and home eﬀort, (1 − α)/α. It is instructive to compare (3.5) to (2.10),
the ratio in the decentralized equilibrium in which individual decisions are distorted by
externalities, subsidies, and fees. If there were no congestion, σ = 0, and the subsidy and
tuition rates were set to zero, τ = z = 0, then (2.10) would coincide with (3.5). Observe
also that the optimal ratio (3.5), like its decentralized counterpart (2.10), is independent
of γ, the spillover parameter for human capital accumulation. As we will show below, it is
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the “wedge” between private and social returns that implies a role for optimal government
policy. Next, using (3.2b,c) or, alternatively, (3.2a,c) we obtain
K∗ = Hi∗ =
1− α
α
He∗, (3.6)
which says that the fiscal policy authorities, given the historically accumulated stock
of human capital, should supply the level of infrastructure given in (3.6) in order to
accommodate optimal school attendance. We now state
Proposition 3. (Time Allocation and Infrastructure in the Social Optimum)
The socially optimal steady state allocations of time spent in home study and in public
schools are given by:
(a) e∗∞ =
αδ
ρ+ δ + δ(1− γ) , (b) i
∗
∞ =
(1− α)δ
ρ+ δ + (1− γ)δ . (3.7)
The socially optimal share of infrastructure in output is equal to:
k∗ ≡ K
∗
Y ∗
=
(1− α)e∗∞
α− e∗∞
=
(1− α)δ
ρ+ δ(1− γ) < 1. (3.8)
To derive equations (3.7) of proposition 3, we note that the law of motion for skills,
as in the decentralized case, equals H1−γ∞ = e∞g(·)/δ in the steady state equilibrium. On
the other hand, µ˙ = 0 in the social optimum requires H1−γ∞ =
g(·)
ρ+δ
[γe∗∞ + α− e∗∞], where
we used (3.5) to eliminate i∗∞. Equating the two relationships for H
1−γ
∞ , we solve for e
∗
∞
and then use (3.5) again to obtain i∗∞.
Comparing (3.7) to (2.15) reveals how externalities cause the decentralized level of
home eﬀort and the time spent in school to depart from their socially optimal levels. For
example, the decentralized length of time devoted to education (setting τ = z = σ = 0),
whether at home or in school, will fall short of its socially optimal counterpart if the
aggregate level of skills have a positive impact on human capital accumulation, i.e., if
γ > 0. On the other hand, assuming τ = z = γ = 0, but allowing for congestion,
0 < σ ≤ 1, agents spend too much time in school relative to the social optimum. The
15
optimal policies we will calculate below will eliminate these discrepancies.20
To compute (3.8), the socially optimal output share of school infrastructure, we di-
vide (3.6) by output Y = (1 − i − e)H, and use (3.5). We find, after substituting for
(3.7a), the expression for k∗. As long as γ < ρ/δ, the optimal share of infrastructure is
less than proportional to the share of school services in the human capital accumulation
function, (1− α). Clearly, the socially optimal share of total resources devoted to school
infrastructure is greater the larger is γ, the aggregate human capital spillover parameter.21
3.2. Optimal Tax/Subsidy Policy
We will show how the private equilibrium stated in section 2.2 can replicate first-best
equilibrium through the use of optimal government policy. We shall limit our attention to
the replication of the steady state equilibrium, though a time-varying government policy
can be used to reproduce the first-best equilibrium along a dynamic path.
Proposition 4. (Optimal Subsidy/Tuition Policy) For the decentralized equilibrium
to become socially optimal, the two economies must attain the same time allocation of
educational activities for any given level of public infrastructure. The first step is to set
the subsidy rates so that the private ratio i/e replicates the socially optimal one. Equating
(2.10) with (3.5), we obtain the restriction:
(1− τ ∗ + z∗) = (1+ σ)(1− τ ∗). (3.9)
where 0 < σ ≤ 1. To generate the same incentives for skill accumulation, we equate the
private and social rates of return to skills given in (2.12a) and (3.4), i.e., rH = rH
∗
.
20As in the decentralized case, H∗∞ can be determined: substitution of (3.5) and (3.7) into the stationary
condition H˙ = 0 implicitly solves for H∗∞. In turn, the shadow value of human capital µ∗∞ can be found
by combining (3.3) with (3.1) and substituting for the socially optimal values we have calculated.
21Note that the long-run shadow value in (2.18) will always decline for an increase in Kˆ as long
as the output share k is less than k∗, or does not exceed k∗ by too much. Substituting (3.8) into
[1− α− (1− γ) k] yields (1− α) ρ/ [ρ+ (1− γ) δ], so that the coeﬃcient on Kˆ in (2.18) is negative.
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Using (2.10) and the restriction on z∗ in (3.9), we obtain the optimal overall subsidy:
τ∗ =
e [(1− α)σ + γ]
α+ e [(1− α)σ + γ] . (3.10)
The relationship (3.9) implies z∗ = σ(1− τ∗), which is combined with (3.10) to derive the
optimal tuition fee:
z∗ =
ασ
α+ e [(1− α)σ + γ] . (3.11)
Proposition 4 states that while a tuition fee should be charged for school attendance,
z∗ > 0, overall eﬀort should receive a subsidy, τ∗ > 0. Observe, however, that if schools
are strictly non-rival public goods, σ = 0, then no tuition fee should be charged, z∗ = 0,
while an overall subsidy should still be oﬀered, τ∗ > 0, as long as there are aggregate
human capital spillovers, γ > 0.
Consider, on the other hand, the case in which there is no aggregate human capital
externality, γ = 0, but public education is subject to congestion, σ > 0. The optimal
values of (3.10, 11) then become:
τ∗ =
(1− α)σe
α+ (1− α)σe, z
∗ =
ασ
α+ (1− α)σe. (3.12)
This implies, as in the general case, that an overall subsidy to skill accumulation should
be oﬀered, while, at the same time, a tuition fee should be imposed. In the absence
of spillovers from aggregate human capital, the trade-oﬀ between education and work is
not distorted.22 Nevertheless, if agents fail to correctly evaluate the benefits of attending
public schools due congestion externalities, private decisions regarding the correct time
allocation between the two educational activities will be. As before, congestion (0 < σ ≤
1) calls for charging tuition fees and subsidizing overall eﬀort. Charging a tuition fee
to prevent congestion must, therefore, be accompanied by an overall subsidy in order to
preserve the overall incentives for educational eﬀort.
22According to Acemoglu and Angrist (1999), it is diﬃcult to establish empirically the existence of
aggregate human capital spillovers.
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4. Comparative Dynamics of Education Reform
In this section we shall discuss the impact of educational policies on the dynamics of
human capital investment. The basis of our analysis will be the log-linearized version of
the system derived in (2.12). Since the derivation of this system involves some lengthy
algebra, we relegate it to the Appendix and simply state it here in matrix form:

·
µˆt
·
Hˆt
 =
 εµ εH
ηµ ηH

 µˆt
Hˆt
+
 εK ετ εz
ηK ητ ηz


Kˆ
τˆ
zˆ
 . (4.1)
The ε and η elements of the coeﬃcient matrices are defined in the Appendix and the
subscript t indicates the variables whose growth rates vary with time. For convenience,
we use the following short-hand matrix notation to represent the dynamic system, X˙ =
AX + B. The roots of the characteristic polynomial, Ψ(ω) = |ωI − A| = 0, of (4.1)
determine a pair of eigenvalues ζ, ζ¯. Since
Ψ(0) = detA = ζζ¯ = εµηH − εHηµ = −ηµ (1− γ) (ρ+ δ + φ) < 0, (4.2)
where φ ≡ δ [α+ (1+ σ) (1− α)] > 0, there exists a positive and a negative root, ζ <
0 < ζ¯, which implies that the equilibrium X∞ = −A−1B of (4.1) is a saddle point. A
particular solution of X is the steady state equilibrium µˆ∞
Hˆ∞
 = −1
detA
 ηH −εH
−ηµ εµ

 b1
b2
 , B ≡
 εKKˆ + ετ τˆ + εz zˆ
ηKKˆ + ητ τˆ + ηz zˆ
 . (4.3)
Equation (4.3) corresponds to the steady state solutions (2.17,18) below.
The solution to (4.1) is Xt − X∞ = Deζt where D = [d1, d2]0 is the eigenvector
corresponding to the stable root ζ < 0. Solving [A − ζI]D = 0 yields the eigenvector
up to a scalar multiple. From the second row, we obtain d1 =
ζ−ηH
ηµ
d2, where d2 is
determined by the initial condition human capital. In this case, Hˆ0 = 0, which implies
that d2 = −Hˆ∞. The complete stable solution of (4.1) for time invariant policy shocks
then equals
Hˆt = (1− eζt)Hˆ∞, µˆt = µˆ∞ + ηH − ζ
ηµ
Hˆ∞eζt. (4.4)
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The stable saddlepath of the system is, in turn, given by
µˆt − µˆ∞ = ζ − ηH
ηµ
(Hˆt − Hˆ∞). (4.5)
which implies that the forward looking variable µˆt can jump at t = 0.
We can illustrate the dynamics of this system with two phase diagrams, Figures 1a and
1b. These depict the negatively sloped stable arm, denoted by XX, and the
·
Hˆt= 0 and
·
µˆt= 0 loci, whose slopes equal −ηH/ηµ and −εH/εµ < 0, respectively. The intersection
of
·
Hˆt= 0 and
·
µˆt= 0 at point A determines the steady state values of Hˆ∞ and µˆ∞.23 The
distinction between the two diagrams is that Figure 1a depicts the case in which the
·
Hˆ t= 0
is positively sloped, while Figure 1b illustrates the case in which the slope of
·
Hˆt= 0 is
negative.24 Since ηµ > 0, Figure 1a corresponds to ηH < 0, while Figure 1b corresponds to
ηH > 0. Rewriting the expression for ηH in (A.9) as [k + γ/ (1− γ)− s¯] δ (1− γ) /s¯ , we
can show that Figure 1a corresponds to the case in which s¯ > k+ γ/(1− γ), while Figure
1b illustrates the case s¯ < k+γ/(1−γ). That is, the slope of
·
Hˆ= 0 is positive (negative)
as the ratio of the time spent in educational activities to the time spent working, s¯, is
greater (less) than the share of educational infrastructure, k, plus the term γ/(1 − γ).
The latter term is greater, the larger is the human capital spillover.
We can use the phase diagrams to illustrate the paths taken by human capital and
its shadow value in response to a time-invariant shift in infrastructure, subsidy, or tuition
policy. To take one example, consider a permanent increase in Kˆ, holding τˆ = zˆ = 0
and letting γ = α. Using (2.17,18), the long-run comparative statics for H∞ and µ∞ are
dHˆ∞/dKˆ = −dµˆ∞/dKˆ = 1. If we also assume that there is no congestion, σ = 0, and
that k = δ(1−α)
ρ+δ
, which is less, according to (3.8), than the corresponding social optimum
k∗, then the
·
Hˆt= 0 locus is negatively sloped, since ηH > 0. Turning to Figure 2 and
equations (4.4,5), we can describe how the dynamic system for these parameter values
23The stable arm XX is negatively sloped, since it is also the case that d1 =
εH
ζ−εµ d2 where
εH
ζ−εµ < 0.
24Note in Figure 1b that the slope of
·
µˆ= 0 is greater in absolute value than that of
·
Hˆ= 0. The
opposite case, i.e., the slope of
·
µˆ= 0 being less in absolute value than that of
·
Hˆ= 0, can be ruled out by
the saddlepoint property.
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adjusts to this shift in education policy. Because εk < 0, ηk > 0 for these parameter
values, an increase in Kˆ causes the
·
µˆt= 0 locus to shift to the right while the
·
Hˆt= 0
locus shifts to the left. Their new intersection at point C illustrates that while human
capital Hˆ∞ increases its shadow value µˆ∞ falls. In order to reach their new steady state
values at C, both Hˆt and µˆt must start at point B and adjust down the new stable locus
towards C. The shadow value, µˆ0, must then jump instantaneously to point B when the
policy change is implemented at t = 0. The rise in µˆ0 reflects the initial drain on resources
that a permanent increase in Kˆ imposes on the economy. Its subsequent fall reflects the
productive impact of the rise in Kˆ on human capital accumulation.
5. Conclusion
Acquiring human capital is naturally considered a form of investment. While public poli-
cies, such as tax credits and depreciation allowances, to promote physical investment
are very widespread, government intervention in the education sector, e.g., in terms of
subsidies, grants, loans, tuition or the direct provision of educational personnel and in-
frastructure, has probably been even more pervasive in most countries, and surely so in
terms of a share of GDP. In this paper we have developed a simple representative agent
model to explore some of the rationales for the large scale public sector intervention in
education. In our framework individuals accumulate human capital by private self-study
and by attending publicly provided schools. The economic returns for the individual are,
however, aﬀected by spillovers. We focused on two distortions in this paper. One was the
aggregate human capital spillover that encouraged the individual to acquire skills. The
other was congestion externalities from school attendance.
Since the individual decides how much time to spend on acquiring human capital
without regard to the aggregate externalities, a corrective subsidy/tuition policy can, in
principle, elicit the socially optimal amount of time spent in home study and in school.
We found that to eliminate an aggregate human capital externality, the total time spent in
accumulating skills should receive a subsidy. In the case of congestion in schools, however,
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a specific tuition fee should be imposed. In making school attendance more expensive,
the fee shifts education towards noninstitutional forms of learning such as home study.
Furthermore, even in the case in which there are no aggregate human capital spillovers,
we determined on eﬃciency grounds that both a subsidy to overall activity and a fees on
school attendance must be imposed to prevent school congestion from impairing overall
skill accumulation. We believe that this policy prescription rationalize some of the recent
continental European reforms such as the introduction of tuition fees combined with
individual student stipends.
6. Appendix
In this section we derive the log-linearized system (4.1). We start with the dynamic
equation for human capital. Consider first the dynamics of working hours, l = 1− i− e,
and output, Y = lH. Working hours evolve according to:
lˆt = −sI ıˆt − sE eˆt, sI ≡ i/l, sE ≡ e/l, s¯ ≡ sE + sI = (1− l)/l. (A.1)
where the “hat”-notation indicates logarithmic (proportional) rates of change relative to
the initial steady state. Note also that we have used the subscript t to distinguish those
variables whose proportional rate of change is time variant from the policy variables that
are not time variant. Taking the logarithmic derivative of (2.10) yields
ıˆt = eˆt − zˆ − z
1− τ τˆ , (A.2)
where τˆ and zˆ are equal to dτ/(1 − τ + z) and dz/(1 − τ + z). Substituting this result
and (A.1) into the rate of growth of output gives us:
Yˆt = lˆt + Hˆt = Hˆt − s¯eˆt + sI zˆ + sIz
1− τ τˆ . (A.3)
Turning to the demand side of the economy, income is devoted to consumption and
public infrastructure, Yt = Ct +K, implying:
Yˆt = (1− k)Cˆt + kKˆ, k ≡ K/Y. (A.4)
21
We next compute the percentage change of the time spent in home study, et. Substituting
for Ct = 1/λt, we calculate the rate of change of (2.11), (1 − τ)θH1−γt = µtαgCt. This
yields:
(1− γ)Hˆt − 1− τ + z
1− τ τˆ = µˆt + gˆ + Cˆt. (A.5)
Substituting (A.3, 4) into (A.5), we then obtain the following expression for eˆt:
eˆt =
1− k
s¯
·
1
1− k − (1− γ)
¸
Hˆt +
1− k
s¯
(µˆt + gˆ) (A.6)
−k
s¯
Kˆ +
1− k
s¯(1− τ)
·
(1− τ + z) + sIz
1− k
¸
τˆ +
sI
s¯
zˆ.
The log-linearized form of (2.12b) and the percentage change of g(Ki/e) are given by
(a)
·
Hˆt= δ
h
eˆt + gˆ − (1− γ) Hˆt
i
, (b) gˆ = (1− α)
·
Kˆ − z
1− τ τˆ − zˆ
¸
, (A.7)
where we have used the steady state restriction egHγ = δH in (A.7a) and (A.2) in the
expression for gˆ. Substitution of (A.6) and (A.7b) into (A.7a) then yields the dynamic
equation in (4.1) for human capital in log-linearized form
·
Hˆ t= ηHHˆt + ηµµˆt + ηkKˆ + ητ τˆ + ηz zˆ, (A.8)
where the η coeﬃcients are defined as:
ηH = δ
h
1
s¯
− (1− γ)
³
1+ 1−k
s¯
´i
, ηµ = δ
1−k
s¯
> 0,
ηK = δ
h
(1− α)
³
1+ 1−k
s¯
´
− k
s¯
i
, ηz = δ
h
sI
s¯
− (1− α)
³
1+ 1−k
s¯
´i
,
ητ =
δ
1−τ
h
1−k
s¯
³
(1− τ + z) + zsI
1−k
´
− (1− α)z
³
1+ 1−k
s¯
´i
.
(A.9)
Turning to log-linearization of equation (2.12a), we obtain
·
µˆt= − (ρ+ δ) rˆHt , where
rH = ρ + δ is the equilibrium interest rate. Using the definition of rH in (2.12a), we
denote the term in square brackets by x = [1− (1− τ )e− (1− τ + z)i]. Using the steady
state conditions H1−γ∞ = e∞g(·)/δ and x∞ = (ρ+δ)(1−τ)e∞αδ , and inserting (2.10), we obtain:
(ρ+ δ) xˆt = −δαeˆt + δα1− τ + z
1− τ τˆ + δ (1+ σ) (1− α) (τˆ − zˆ − ıˆt) . (A.10)
Taking the diﬀerential of rH = αg
1−τH
γ−1 · x yields:
rˆHt = gˆ − (1− γ)Hˆt +
1− τ + z
1− τ τˆ + xˆt. (A.11)
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Substituting for ıˆt from (A.2) into (A.10) and then the resulting expression into (A.11),
we find
rˆHt = gˆ − (1− γ)Hˆt +
1− τ + z
1− τ τˆ +
φ
ρ+ δ
·
1− τ + z
1− τ τˆ − eˆt
¸
, (A.12)
where φ ≡ δ [α+ (1+ σ) (1− α)]. Finally, we substitute for gˆ and for eˆt from (A.7b)
and (A.6) into (A.12) and then substitute the resulting expression into
·
µˆt= −(ρ+ δ)rˆHt to
obtain the log-linearized equation in (4.1) for the shadow value of human capital
·
µˆt= −(ρ+ δ)rˆHt = εHHˆt + εµµˆt + εKKˆ + ετ τˆ + εz zˆ, (A.13)
where the ε coeﬃcients are given by:
εH = (ρ+ δ)(1− γ) + φ(1−k)s¯
h
1
1−k − (1− γ)
i
> 0, εµ =
φ(1−k)
s¯
> 0,
εK = (1− α)
h
φ(1−k)
s¯
− (ρ+ δ)
i
− φk
s¯
,
ετ = −(ρ+ δ)(1+ αz1−τ )− φ(1−τ+z)1−τ (1− 1−ks¯ )− φ(1−k)z(1−τ)s¯ (1− α− sI1−k),
εz =
φsI
s¯
− (1− α)
h
φ(1−k)
s¯
− (ρ+ δ)
i
.
(A.14)
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